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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
An awareness of earthquakes and their possible effects upon the nation's infrastructure are 
eritieally important to the public, and in partjcul'!r, to public officials. The nation's highway 
system is one of the most important components of the infrastructure. After the occurrence of 
an earthquake, the highway system is the primary mode of transporting emergency supplies 
and services into an affected area. Thus, it is important to catalog the important components 
of the highway system and attempt to anticipate the possible damage to these components 
from an earthquake. 
Western Kentucky is in a high risk earthquake zone. In 1811-1812, three of the most severe 
earthquakes in American history shook the country. The location of these earthquakes was not 
on the infamous San Andreas fault nor anywhere along the well-known fault laden Pacific 
coast but was near a small town on the Mississippi River where the states of Kentucky and 
Missouri share a border. It is this river town, New Madrid, Missouri, that is the namesake of 
a region now regarded by seismologists and disaster response planners as the most hazardous 
earthquake zone east of the Rocky Mountains-- the New Madrid seismic zone. 
Concern has grown in recent years over the seismic activity of the New Madrid seismic zone 
in Western Kentucky. In 1987, the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet commissioned the 
Kentucky Transportation Center to analyze and assess the possible effects of an earthquake 
on highway facilities. Since 1987, over 1,000 miles of priority routes have been recommended 
· for the transportation of goods and services after a major earthquake. This report summarizes 
the mitigation research that has been conducted. This report also discusses a plan for 
continuing earthquake mitigation in Kentucky through seminars, discusses bridge retrofitting, 
and makes recommendations for a post earthquake response. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An awareness of earthquakes and their possible effects upon the nation's infrastructure are 
critically important to the public, and in particulm, to publie effieials. The nation's highway 
system is one of the most important components of the infrastructure. Mer the occurrence of 
an earthquake, the highway system is the primary mode of transporting emergency supplies 
and services into an affected area. Thus, it is important to catalog the important components 
of the highway system and attempt to anticipate the possible damage to these components 
from an earthquake. Figure 1 indicates areas within the United States that are at risk of being 
damaged by a major earthquake (1). 
Western Kentucky is in a high risk earthquake zone. In 1811-1812, three of the most severe 
earthquakes in American history shook the country. The location of these earthquakes was not 
on the infamous San Andreas fault nor anywhere along the well-known fault laden Pacific 
coast but was near a small town on the Mississippi River where the states of Kentucky and 
Missouri share a border (Figure 2)(2). It is this river town, New Madrid, Missouri, that is the 
namesake of a region now regarded by seismologists and disaster response planners as the 
most hazardous earthquake zone east of the Rocky Mountains--the New Madrid seismic zone. 
In addition to these three great earthquakes, there are several other well documented factors 
demonstrating the susceptibility of the New Madrid region to the recurrence of major 
earthquakes. Through a decade of extensive research, an ancient crustal rift has been found 
to underlie the relatively shallow sediments comprising the region's surface. This type of 
geologic structure is prone to seismic activity. The New Madrid rift also known as the Reelfoot 
Rift Complex has been identified as being of sufficient size to generate major earthquakes 
(Figure 3(2) and 4(3)). Further evidence of the area's seismicity is the 488 earthquakes greater 
than a magnitude of 3 that have been recorded between 1811 to mid 1974 (Figure 5)(2). Over 
2,000 earthquakes have been detected in the zone since 1974 (Figure 6)(2). Though most have 
been of a magnitude below the threshold of human perception, their existence clearly indicates 
the high level of seismic activity occurring in the zone. 
Seismologists have calculated the probabilities of recurrence of sizeable earthquakes in the 
New Madrid rift zone. The probability of a magnitude 6.3 earthquake (Richter scale) within 
50 years is from 86 to 97 percent. The probability of that same earthquake occurring within 
the next 15 years is from 40 to 63 percent (4). For comparison, the 1971 San Fernando 
earthquake (magnitude 6.6) killed 58 people and caused $480 million worth of dmnage. The 
1988 Armenian earthquake of similar magnitude killed approximately 25,000 to 30,000 people. 
The probability of a magnitude 7.6 earthquake occurring within 50 years is from 19 to 29 
percent. The probability for this size earthquake occurring within 15 years drops to a range 
of 5.4 to 8. 7 percent. On February 4, 1975, the Haicheng earthquake in China had a magnitude 
of 7.3 and destroyed or damaged about 90 percent of the structures in a city of 90,000 people. 
Figure 7 shows the cumulative number of different magnitude earthquakes a year that occur 
in the New Madrid Seismic Zone (2). 
When comparing historical earthquakes of similar magnitude, one must take into consideration 
that death totals and damage estimates will vary greatly due to the geology, population 
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density, types of building, and quality of construction. 
For a given earthquake, effects at a given location are described by the Modified Mercalli 
Intensity (MMI) scale (5) which rauges ftom I (no damage and felt only by instT1Jment.s) to XII 
(total destruction). Details of the MMI scale are given in Table 1. Values of MMI associated 
with the 1811-1812 earthquakes are shown in Figure 8. The potential for damage and 
destruction from earthquakes in Western Kentucky is significant. 
BACKGROUND 
In 1982, the Governor's Task Force on Earthquake Hazards and Safety was created to evaluate 
Kentucky's earthquake risk and to make recommendations for responding to those risks. This 
task force recommended increased public awareness and education programs, improved 
emergency response planning and training, improved building codes and seismic restraint 
designs, evaluation of other mitigation measures, and participation in national and regional 
earthquake forums and funding programs. 
In 1984, Governor Collins created the Governor's Earthquake Hazards and Safety Technical 
Advisory Panel (GEHSTAP) to analyze scientific and engineering data regarding seismic risks 
in Kentucky and to make specific recommendations on mitigation, public awareness, response 
planning, and policy development for public health and safety. The States are dependent on 
their highway systems for the movement of goods and services. Due to the possible adverse 
effects a major earthquake could have on this system, the Earthquake Stability and 
Transportation Subcommittee (ESTS) of GEHSTAP was formed. 
ESTS has encouraged the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet to secure funding for developing 
and implementing an earthquake hazard mitigation plan in an attempt to safeguard the 
highway system against catastrophic earthquake failure. As a result, in 1987 Cabinet officials 
commissioned the Kentucky Transportation Center investigators at the University of Kentucky 
to analyze and assess the possible effects of an earthquake on highway facilities. The study 
area includes the 26 western-most counties in Kentucky that are adjacent to the New Madrid 
seismic zone (Figure 9). 
Objectives 
The objectives of this study were as follows: 
1. To make a literature search and identify publications relating to the topic and review those 
articles containing up-to-date and relevant information. To utilize that information and data 
as applicable to the following objectives. 
2. To research and recommend criteria and policy for determining priority routes and 
identifying the functions of those routes. 
3. To analyze selected man-made and natural structures that are judged marginally stable for 
a design seismic event for each priority route, and to make recommendations on remedial 
action for a particular structure. These recommendations may include retrofitting selected 
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bridges; stabilizing some earth embankments, dams and natural slopes, power transmission 
lines, and pipelines; and preventing subsidence from underground mines. These structures 
would be analyzed only if their failure would adversely affect a priority route. 
4. To recommend emergency response procedures and policies for transportation engineering 
personnel, and to develop a training program for district highway personnel on 
implementing these procedures in the event of an earthquake emergency. These procedures 
would supplement emergency procedures developed by other agencies, and would relate only 
to keeping priority routes open in the event of a seismic emergency. 
5. To review current seismic design codes for transportation facilities and to recommend 
changes to the Department of Highways. 
6. To research and develop a procedure for updating seismic risks maps for all priority routes. 
Completed Objectives 
As fulfillment of objectives 2 and 3, Research Report UKTRP-88-2 "Earthquake Hazard 
Mitigation of Transportation Facilities" was submitted to Kentucky Transportation Cabinet 
officials in January 1988. The report recommends over 1,000 miles of highways to be utilized 
as emergency or "priority" routes (Figure 10)(6). These would be the primary routes used for 
transporting emergency supplies and personnel after the occurrence of an earthquake. Also, 
it is anticipated that these would be the first routes repaired after the occurrence of an 
earthquake. The priority routes were visually surveyed and all natural and man-made features 
along these routes that are considered seismically significant were cataloged. This includes 
dams, pipelines, power lines, high fills, cut slopes, buildings, mines, bridges, trees, faults, etc. 
The initial task in identifYing these priority routes was to decide where they should begin; that 
is, in the event of a major earthquake, the point at which the transport of goods and services 
would originate. Ideally, the city chosen should possess the following attributes: 
1. Sufficient size to contain all necessary personnel, supplies, and facilities to respond quickly 
to a major emergency; 
2. Proximity to the high hazard area to speed the relief effort but not so close as to suffer the 
same high risk potential; 
3. Easy access from other major cities in the State; and 
4. Sufficient routes to provide relatively direct access to all 26 high-risk counties. 
The city best fitting these criteria is Bowling Green. Located at the eastern edge of the 
earthquake zone in Warren County, Bowling Green meets both the size criterion (population 
40,450) and the accessibility criterion (Louisville and Nashville via Interstate 65 and Lexington 
via the Bluegrass Parkway). Bowling Green provides access to the 26-county area via US 
68/KY 80. This road was chosen as the main east-west artery because it crosses Lake Barkley 
and Kentucky Lake upstream from the dams impounding those bodies of water. Additional 
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priority routes were added on the upstream side of Lake Barkley and Kentucky Lake through 
northern Tennessee (Figure 11)(7). 
In 1989, individUlil research reports for each of the 26 counties in the stlidy-area were 
submitted to Kentucky Transportation Cabinet officials (Research Reports KTC-89-4 through 
KTC-89-29). An additional report was issued for priority routes in Northern Tennessee (KTC-
89-41). The reports list and discuss all natural and man-made features that were logged along 
the priority routes that are considered seismically significant. All seismically significant 
features were logged in a data base and strip maps showing these features were prepared for 
each route and county. For completion of Objective 3, a seismic analysis for each bridge on the 
priority routes will be submitted to the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet officials in 1990. The 
bridge report will contain an inventory of all276 bridges cataloged on the priority routes. The 
seismic analysis of each bridge was completed in January 1990. It is estimated that 111 
bridges will need retrofitting at a total cost of $6.5 million (8). This does not include the 
bridges over Kentucky Lake and Lake Barkley located on US 68/KY 80. 
A bibliography is included at the end of this report to document completion of Objective 1. 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONTINUING EARTHQUAKE 
MITIGATION IN KENTUCKY 
Staff Position Of Earthquake Coordinator 
To continue earthquake mitigation in Kentucky, a staff position in the Transportation Cabinet 
should be established. The person assigned to this position should be responsible for 
maintaining the priority route data base, strip maps, bridge data base, and to supervise the 
hardening of the priority routes against potential earthquake damage. Hardening would 
include bridge retrofitting, stabilization of rock and soil cuts, and those seismically significant 
features that could be retrofitted. This position would also require working closely with 
officials in the 26 high risk counties and the three highway district offices. This individual 
should also conduct earthquake training seminars to educate state officials and maintenance 
personnel, develop a working post earthquake response plan, and further earthquake 
mitigation in Kentucky. 
Updating Priority Route Data Base and Seismic Risk Maps 
The Earthquake Coordinator should be responsible for updating the seismic risk maps. The 
coordinator should also be aware of any closure or detour of a priority route. The priority route 
data base from which the seismic risk maps are generated is constantly changing. Changes in 
the data base include various types of road construction (widening, detour, failures, etc), 
retrofitting, bridge construction, etc. The routes should be inspected by department personnel 
yearly so that the seismic risk maps may be updated. A standard updating form should be 
developed for such purpose. Forms would be forwarded to the Earthquake Coordinator. 
Earthquake Training Seminar 
The Earthquake Coordinator should be responsible for conducting earthquake training 
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seminars to educate state officials and department personnel about earthquakes in Kentucky. 
The seminar should be presented yearly. A supplementary video tape should be developed for 
new personnel. The seminar should include the general history of earthquakes, the history of 
earthquakes in KentuckY, behaVIor of earthquakes, current seismic research, mitigation, 
priority routes, bridge retrofitting, and post earthquake response. 
A general outline for a training seminar is included in a Appendix A 
Post Earthquake Response Team 
One of the main duties of the Earthquake Coordinator should be to develop and supervise 
(when the need arises) a post earthquake response team. The Earthquake Coordinator should 
work closely with the Bowling Green Chief District Engineer and the Chief District Engineers 
from Districts 1 and 2 to develop an action plan in case of the occurrence of a major 
earthquake in Western Kentucky. Included in this plan would be equipment needs for a proper 
response, a team of estimators to check for damage after the occurrence of an earthquake, and 
maintenance personnel trained for quick, safe, temporary repairs on bridges and priority 
routes. Included in Appendix A is a discussion of post earthquake response. A flow chart 
illustrating various post earthquake responses is included in Appendix B. 
Scope of Earthquake Mitigation 
The Earthquake Coordinator should be also aware of other potential hazards that may not only 
affect transportation but local industry, environment, and possibly the eastern United States. 
These features include possible loss of a major gas transmission line, a large dam, and possible 
failure of one of the many large crude oil and gasoline pipelines located throughout the State. 
Loss of a major gas transmission line would severely affect industry and millions of homes. 
Loss of a dam and/or dams such as the ones impounding Kentucky Lake and Lake Barkley 
would devastate towns along the Cumberland, Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi rivers. There 
could also be loss of drinking water, electricity, and transportation. A failure or break in one 
of the large pipelines could have devastating effects upon ground water and drinking water. 
Several pipelines cross Kentucky and the Ohio River. A 40-inch pipeline crosses the western 
part of the State through Fulton, Hickman, Carlisle, and Ballard Counties. 
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Figure 6. Epicenters of New Madrid Earthquakes 
(1974-1988). 
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Table 1: MODIFIED MERCALLI INTENSITY SCALE 
Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale, 1956 Version 
The following comments by Dr. Richter precede the published statement of the intensity scale: 
... Each effect is named at the level of intensity at which it lirst appears frequently and characteristically. Each effect may be found less strongly, or in fewer in~ances1 at the next )ower grade of intensity; more strongly or more often at the next higher grade. A few effects are named at two successive 1eve1s to mdicate a more tradua 
increase. 
Masonry A, B, C, D. To avoid ambiguity of language, the quality of masonry, brick or otherwise, is specified by the following 1ettering. 
Masonry A. Good workmanship, mortar, and design: reinforced, especially laterally, and bound together by using steel, concrete, etc.; designed lo resistllateral 
forces. 
Masonry B. Good workmanship and mortar, reinforced by not designed in detail to resist lateral forces. 
Masonry C. Ordinary workmanship and mortar; no extreme weakness like failing to tie corners, but neither reinforced nor designed against horizontallforces. 
Masonry D. Weak materials, such as adobe; poor mortar; low standards of workmanship; weak horizontally. 
The following list represents the twelve grades of the scale. 
I. Not felt. Marginal and long-period efTecL~ of large earthquakes. 
II. Felt by persons at rest, on upper noors, or favorable placed. 
Ill. Felt indoors, Hanging objects swing. Vibration like passing of light trucks. Duration estimated. May not be recognized as an earthquake. 
1V. Hanging objects swii!J(. Vibration Hke P.assinR of heayy trucks; or sensation of a jolt 1ike a heayy ball striking the waHs. Standing motor cars rock. Win~ows, 
dishes, doors rattle. Glasses clink. Crockery dashes. In the upper range of IV wooden wal1s and frame creak. 
V. Fe1t outdoors; direction estimated. Sleepers awakened. Liquids disturbed, some spilled. Small unstable objects displaced or upset. Doors HWing, close, o! . 
Shutters, pictures move. Pendulum clocks stop, start, change rate. 
VI. Felt by_ all. Many frightened and run outdoors. Persons walk unsteadily. Windowsi\ dishes, glassware brokenj Knickknacks, books, etc., off shelves. Pictu s oiT 
wa1is. l''umiture moved or overturned. Weak plaster and masonry I) cracked. Sma hel1s ring (church, schoo ). Trees, bushes shaken. 
VII. Difficult to stand. Noticed by drive"' of motor cars. Hanging objects quiver. Furniture broken. Damage to masonry D. including cracks. Weak chimneys broken 
at roof line. Fal1 of r1aster, loose bricks, stones, tiles. cornices. Same cracke in masonry C. Waves on ponds; water turbid with mud. SmaU slides and c ving in 
along sand or grave banks. Large bells ring. Concrete irrigation ditches damaged. 
Vlll. Steerif!B of motor cars affected. Damage to masonry C; partial collapse. Some dama~ to masonry R; none to masonry A. Fall of stucco and eome maso!ry 
walls. Twisting, fall or chimneys, factory stacks, monumenL~. towers, elevated tanks. Frame hom'les moved on foundat1on if not bolted down; loose panel walls 
thrown out. Decayed piling broken oiT. Branches broken from trees. Changes in now or temperature of springs and wells. Cracks in wet ground and on steep 
slopes. 
IX. General panic. Masonry D dest~ed; masonry C heavily damaged, sometimes with complete collapse; masonry B seriously damaged. Frame structures, if not 
bolted, ehirted off foundations. i''rames cracked. Serious damage to reservoirs. Underground pipes broken. Conspicuous cracks in ground. In alluviated reas 
sand and mud ejected, earthquake fountains, sand crater. 
X. Most masonry and frame structures destroyed with their foundations. Some wil1.built wooden structures and bridges destroy_ed. Serious dama_ge to da~s. dikes, 
embankments. Large land slide.<~. Water tlirown on banks of canals, river, lakes, etc. Sand and mud shilled horizontally on beaches and nat IRnds. R8Jls bent 
slighlly. 
XI. Rails bent greatly. Underground pipelines completely out of service. 
XH. Damage nearly total. Large rock masses displaced. Line!! of !light and 1evel distorted. Objects thrown in the air. 
Figure 8. Location of New Madrid Seismic Zone and the Mercalli 
Modified Intensity Scale Suggesting the Possible Effects 
of an Earthquake as Severe as the 1811-1812 Quakes 
(Source--U.S. Geological Survey). 
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EARTHQUAKE TRAINING SEMINAR 
The following is an outline for the suggested seminar. 
A. History of Earthquakes 
B. Behavior of Earthquakes 
C. History of Earthquakes in Kentucky 
D. Current Seismic Research 
E. Earthquake Mitigation 
1. CUSEPP 
2. GEHSTAP 
3. ESTS 
4. Priority Routes 
5. Data Base 
6. Strip Maps 
7. County Information 
II. Bridge Retrofitting 
III. Response Team 
A. History of Earthquakes 
A great earthquake ranks as one of nature's most catastrophic and devastating events. 
Earthquakes and their related hazards have destroyed large cities and taken thousands of 
lives in a few seconds. In 1886, an earthquake in Charleston South Carolina claimed 60 lives 
and approximately $23 million in property damage. The 1906 San Francisco earthquake 
claimed 700 lives and $524 million in property damage. The 1964 earthquake in Alaska 
claimed 13llives and $500 million in property damage. The San Fernando earthquake in 1971 
claimed 65 lives and $553 million in property damage. The 1989 San Francisco earthquake 
claimed 62 lives. This is only a small portion of the recorded earthquakes which have occurred 
within the United States that have claimed thousands of lives and caused billions of dollars 
in property damage. 
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B. Behavior of Earthquakes 
Earthquakes occur as a result of the release of stress within in rock which was under strain. 
Breakage of rocks and resulting movement along a fault produces seismic waves. Primary and 
secondary waves travel within the rock layexs and otl1er more eemplex v:aves trw;el along the 
surface of the earth (1). Surface waves roll along the ground surface and create the greatest 
amount of damage to structures such as roads, buildings. bridges, etc. 
The focus of an earthquake is the point within the rock where initial motion takes place and 
the epicenter is the point at the ground surface directly above the focus. 
The strength of an earthquake is measured by its magnitude. Magnitude is determined as the 
amplitude of the largest wave which is recorded by a seismograph. The amplitude is measured 
on a logarithmic scale. An earthquake of magnitude of 7.0 would be 10 times greater than an 
earthquake of magnitude of 6.0. 
Another means of measurement is by the Modified Mercalli Intensity scale (MMI). The MMI 
scale is a visual measurement of the earthquake intensity and damage. The scale ranges from 
I (no damage and felt only by instruments) to XII (total destruction). Details of the MMI scale 
are presented in Table 1. 
The amount of damage which occurs as the result of an earthquake depends upon several 
variables. Magnitude of the earthquake, population density, seismic design codes, and the 
geology of the area (surface material) all have an effect upon total damage. 
As shown in Figure 12, amplification of shaking at the earth's surface is greatly effected by 
the surface material (1). Basically the softer the surface material is the greater the shaking. 
For example, during the October 1989, earthquake in San Francisco more damage occurred 
around the Bay Area where buildings are constructed on old fill and Bay mud. This is one of 
the greatest concerns in Western Kentucky since numerous buildings are constructed upon 
loosely consolidated river deposits such as alluvium. Another problem that evolves during an 
earthquake is liquefaction. Liquefaction is a loss of soil support due to an increase in pore-
water pressure due to intense shaking (such as an earthquake). This occurs commonly in soils 
that are highly saturated. During liquefaction, the soil changes form from a solid to a liquid. 
The resulting change is a loss of soil support. A number of structures in Western Kentucky 
rely upon the soil for support. Structures constructed upon loosely consolidated soils such has 
muds, silts, and sands will stand a greater chance of being damaged during an earthquake. 
C. History of Earthquakes in Kentucky 
In 1811-1812, three of the most severe earthquakes in American history shook the country. 
The location of these quakes was near a small town on the Mississippi River where the state 
of Kentucky and Missouri share a border. It is this river town, New Madrid, Missouri, that is 
the namesake of a region now regarded by seismologists and disaster response planners as the 
most hazardous earthquake zone east of the Rocky Mountains--the New Madrid seismic zone 
(Figure 2). 
Between 1811-1812, hundreds of tremors were felt until March 15, 1812. During this period, 
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three series of shocks struck the New Madrid region. These had magnitudes of7.5, 7.3 and 7.8 
(Richter Scale). Ground motion waves of eight feet in height and sand spewing like geysers 
from the ground were reported. The most remarkable and permanent occurrence of the 1811-
1812 earthquakes was the creation of Reelfoot Lake in Western Tennessee. For a time, the 
course of the MlBSlSSlppl reversed. On February 12, 1812, the river app!H"ently-rose above and 
below New Madrid and which caused a temporary change in course. 
Until July, 1980, Kentucky officials had done very little to prepare for the effects of a major 
earthquake. A 5.2 earthquake struck in northern Kentucky, approximately 50 km east-
northeast of Lexington near the small Kentucky town of Sharpsburg on July 27, 1980. Major 
damage occurred in Maysville approximately 50 km from the epicenter. It is theorized that 
ground motion in Maysville was amplified 2 to 3 times due to the underlying alluvium. 
The Sharpsburg earthquake was the result ofright-lateral, strike slip movement along a fault. 
The Sharpsburg quake has little seismic correlation with the New Madrid Fault Zone. The 
Sharpsburg quake demonstrated the vulnerability of all of Kentucky to potentially damaging 
quakes and high potential for damage to occur in area's constructed over alluvial deposits. The 
area in most eminent danger and therefore of greatest concern is that surrounding the New 
Madrid seismic zone. 
D. Current Seismic Research 
In addition to these three great earthquakes, there are several other well documented factors 
demonstrating the susceptibility of the New Madrid region to the recurrence of major 
earthquakes. Through a decade of extensive research, an ancient crustal rift has been found 
to underlie the relatively shallow sediments comprising the region's surface. This type of 
geologic structure is prone to seismic activity. The New Madrid rift, also known as the Reelfoot 
Rift Complex, has been identified as being of sufficient size to generate major earthquakes 
(Figure 3 and 4). Further evidence of the area's seismicity is the 488 earthquakes greater than 
a magnitude of 3 that have been recorded between 1811 to mid 1974 (Figure 5). Over 2,000 
earthquakes have been detected in the zone since 1974 (Figure 6). Though most have been of 
a magnitude below the threshold of human perception, their existence clearly indicates the 
high level of seismic activity occurring in the zone. 
Seismologists have calculated the probabilities of recurrence of sizeable earthquakes in the 
New Madrid rift zone. The probability of a magnitude 6.3 earthquake (Richter scale) within 
50 years is from 86 to 97 percent. The probability of that same earthquake occurring within 
the next 15 years is from 40 to 63 percent. For comparison, the 1971 San Fernando earthquake 
(magnitude 6.6) killed 58 people and caused $480 million worth of damage. The 1988 Armenian 
earthquake of similar magnitude killed approximately 25,000 to 30,000 people. 
The probability of a magnitude 7.6 earthquake occurring within 50 years is from 19 to 29 
percent. The probability for this size earthquake occurring within 15 years drops to a range 
of 5.4 to 8. 7 percent. On February 4, 1975, the Haicheng earthquake in China had a magnitude 
of 7.3 and destroyed or damaged about 90 percent of the structures in a city of 90,000 people. 
Figure 7 shows the cumulative number of different magnitude earthquakes a year that occur 
in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. 
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E. EARTHQUAKE MITIGATION 
1. CUSEPP 
In 1981, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) initiated the Central United 
States Earthquake Preparedness Project (CUSEPP) to help state governments increase their 
capability to respond to damaging earthquakes, to promote mitigation activities, and to 
encourage cooperation between state in the area of emergency planning. 
2. GEHSTAP 
In 1984, Governor Collins created the Governor's Earthquake Hazards and Safety Technical 
Advisory Panel (GEHSTAP) to analyze scientific and engineering data regarding seismic risks 
in Kentucky and to make specific recommendations on mitigation, public awareness, response 
planning, and policy development for public health and safety. 
3. ESTS 
The States are dependent upon their highway systems for the movement of goods and services. 
Due to the possible adverse effects that a major earthquake could have on this system, the 
Earthquake Stability and Transportation Subcommittee (ESTS) of GEHSTAP was formed. 
ESTS encouraged the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet officials to secure funding for 
generating and implementing an earthquake hazard mitigation plan in an attempt to 
safeguard the highway system against catastrophic earthquake failure. As a result, Cabinet 
officials commissioned Kentucky Transportation Center investigators at the University of 
Kentucky to analyze and assess the possible effects of an earthquake on highway facilities. 
4. Priority Routes 
Over 1,000 miles of highways have been selected to be utilized as emergency or priority routes 
(Figure 10). These would be the primary routes used for transporting emergency supplies and 
personnel after the occurrence of an earthquake. It is anticipated that these would be the first 
routes repaired after the occurrence of an earthquake. The priority routes were visually 
surveyed and all natural and man-made features along these routes that are considered 
seismic significant were cataloged. This includes dams, pipelines, power lines, high fills, cut 
slopes, buildings, mines, bridges, trees, faults, etc. 
The initial task in identifying these priority routes was to decide where they should begin; that 
is, in the event of a major earthquake, the point at which the transport of goods and services 
should originate. The city chosen should possess the following attributes: 
1. Sufficient size to contain all necessary personnel, supplies, and facilities to respond quickly 
to a major emergency; 
2. Proximity to the high hazard area to speed the relief effort but not so close as to suffer the 
same high risk potential; 
3. Easy access from other major cities within the State; and 
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4. Sufficient routes to provide relatively direct access to all 26 high-risk counties. 
The city best fitting these criteria is Bowling Green. Located at the eastern edge of the 
earthquake zone in Warren County, Bowling Green meets both the size criterion (population 
40,450) and the accessibility criterion (Louisville and Nashville via I 65 and Lexington via the 
Bluegrass Parkway). Bowling Green provides access to the 26-county area via US 68/KY 80; 
this road was chosen as the main east-west artery because it crosses Lake Barkley and 
Kentucky Lake upstream from the dams impounding those bodies of water. Additional priority 
routes were added on the upstream side of Lake Barkley and Kentucky Lake through northern 
Tennessee (Figure 11). 
5. Strip Maps 
Strip maps were compiled upon completion of the visual survey of the priority routes. 
Compilations were made in a strip manner (10 miles per page) with mileposts increasing up 
the page. Each feature identified during visual surveys is shown in symbol form beside the 
appropriate mile point number. Feature locations are rounded to the nearest tenth of a mile 
(Figure 13). These maps were produced in two formats, one separating them by route and the 
other separating them by county. This will enable relief personnel examining the maps to be 
aware of all potential hazards that may be encountered along the entire length of a priority 
route as well as making it possible to distribute maps to county officials showing just those 
seismically significant features under their jurisdiction. 
6. Data Base 
The priority route data base was entered on an IBM Lap Top computer. The data were entered 
into a DBASE program called QUAKE5. The QUAKE5 program establishes separate files for 
each priority route. The entire data base in QUAKE5 was then loaded into a program called 
COMBINED which enables the user to sort the files by county and route. A program called 
DETAIL 8 which produces the county reports uses the data in the COMBINED data file and 
converts them into a standard data file to be used in WordPerfect. The entire data file contains 
292,320 bytes of information. 
7. County Information 
Individual reports were prepared for each of the 26 counties. Each report contains a short 
history about earthquakes in Kentucky and discusses the probabilities of an earthquake. The 
reports also introduces the Modified Mercalli Intensity scale which illustrates the damage that 
could occur today if we had an earthquake similar to the 1811-1812 earthquakes (Figure 14). 
The reports introduce the priority route for each county, lists all seismically significant 
features along the priority routes in each county, and discusses each feature in some detail 
(Figure 15). All the seismically significant features were also logged on strip maps. An alluvial 
map showing location of weak soil is also included in each report (Example Figure 16). 
II. BRIDGE RETROFITI'ING 
Within the 1,000 miles of priority routes, 276 bridges have been cataloged. With few 
exceptions, existing highway bridges in the study area have not been designed to resist 
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motions and forces that may be generated by earthquakes. According to the seismic analysis, 
111 bridges have been determined to be possibly unsafe during a major earthquake. Figure 17 
shows the number of unsafe bridges on the priority route system for each county. 
Kentucky officials are considering retrofitting highway bridges against the possible damage 
that could be sustained by an earthquake generated by the New Madrid Fault Zone. 
Information gathered by California investigators has been used in these analyses. 
An earthquake measuring 6.6 on the Richter scale did extensive damage in Sylmar and the 
surrounding area in the northwest San Fernando Valley of Los Angeles County on February 
9, 1971. Approximately $15 million of damage was done to the highway system. Half of that 
damage was on bridges. In 1971 California Highway Department officials established a bridge 
retrofitting plan. California officials identified 12,500 state bridges, of which 1,259 were judged 
to need retrofitting. Retrofit work was completed on 702 structures at an average cost of 
$41,262 per bridge as of June 21, 1983. 
Retrofitting Philosophy 
The goal of retrofitting is to increase the seismic resistance of a bridge to minimize the 
probability of total collapse and should eliminate or reduce the hazard to human life as much 
as possible. Bridges on critical routes should be capable of carrying emergency vehicles after 
damage. It is not practical or economically feasible to retrofit a bridge so that it will have the 
same seismic resistance as a new structure designed to current seismic specifications. 
What Type of Bridge Should Be Considered for Retrofitting ? 
Single span square structures should not normally require retrofitting (Figure 18). 
Skewed bridges have a tendency to rotate. Longitudinal seismic forces produce transverse 
components of force which tend to rotate the span each time it moves back and forth. Longer 
structures are more likely the to rotate from their bearings. Long narrow structures having 
narrow support seats stand a greater chance of catastrophic failure (Figure 19). If a bridge is 
wide in relation to its length, it may be locked between its abutments so that the rotation is 
negligible if the force is longitudinal. Transverse Shaking may damage the bearings, Shear 
keys, of curtain walls (Figure 20). 
Long, continuous, non-skewed bridges having diaphragm type abutments without intermediate 
hinges or joints should not require retrofitting. Bridges having bearings at the abutments may 
require transverse restrainers (Figure 21). 
Long, simply supported, non-skewed, multi-span bridges having narrow seats less than 6-
inches probably should be retrofitted (Figure 22). 
Long, continuous, skewed or curved bridges without intermediate hinges or joints are more 
prone to seismic damage than similar square bridges (Figure 23). Structural segments which 
are not adequately restrained act independently and may tend to separate when shaken. 
Sharply curved bridges which have seismically inadequate bearings at an abutment and which 
have very flexible or seismically deficient columns may require additional restraint at the 
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abutments. 
Long continuously reinforced concrete slab bridges normally do not need to be retrofitted. This 
is based upon the assumption that if the suspended span becomes unseated the deadload of 
the resulth1g cantilever will net-be suffiGient to make it fail Any bridge having large steel 
support bearings should be considered for retrofitting. 
Methods of Retrofitting 
It is not practical to attempt to alleviate all potential earthquake damage to the majority of 
these structures because of their age. There are several methods of retrofitting that are 
available. Lead cored isolating bearings can be purchased but at a high cost (Figure 24). The 
best suited and most cost effective retrofitting would be using cable and bar restrainers (Figure 
25), diaphragms, and catch blocks (Figure 26). 
California officials initiated a retrofitting program in 1971. In July 1989, California personnel 
forwarded University of Kentucky investigators the latest retrofitting procedures. California 
retrofitting relies heavily on cable and bar restrainers. There was concern by the authors, since 
the San Francisco earthquake in October 1990 that retrofitting methods that had previously 
been used may not have been effective. However, California officials, have verbally indicated 
that approximately 848 retrofitted bridges were in the area most effected by the earthquake. 
Of those 848 bridges, only one received considerable damage, and that has since been graded 
to minor damage. It appears that cable and bar restrainers are effective and practical means 
of retrofitting bridges against earthquake motions. 
III. ESTABLISH A RESPONSE TEAM 
A plan should be developed for post earthquake response. In addition to training state and 
local personnel about earthquakes and mitigation. An information gathering center and a 
command post should be established at Bowling Green for the entire priority route system for 
post earthquake response. The District 3 Chief District Engineer should be in charge of 
gathering information on the condition of the priority routes from the 26 counties after a major 
earthquake. District 3 office personnel should have an up to date map of the entire priority 
route system listing critical features. Priority routes that are drivable should be marked on 
the up dated map in green and red showing failures (closures) as information is gathered from 
the 26 counties concerning conditions. Bowling Green District office personnel work closely 
with the Red Cross, DES, and the National Guard to help with the movement of goods and 
services into the earthquake stricken zone. 
A post-earthquake response group should be selected to estimate damage sustained by the 
priority routes. The group would consist of state personnel and local firms consisting of 
engineers, inspectors, and maintenance personnel that would evaluate the damage done to the 
surrounding priority routes. This information should be channeled to the District 3 Office. The 
groups would report the condition of the priority routes and if necessary, an estimate of repair 
time involved would be made. The group would also designate detour routes if needed and 
report those routes to officials in Bowling Green and the surrounding area's. This group would 
then report to the construction squad the location of damage to priority routes. Every county 
that has a priority route should have an evaluation group and a construction squad for 
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emergency response. 
The construction squad would consist of engineers and construction and maintenance 
personnel who make repairs or clear the priority routes. They would relay information on 
repair time and construction progress back to the District 3 Office. 
Post Earthquake Response (Equipment) 
Post earthquake response time would depend upon communication and equipment availability. 
It is highly probable that telephones will be out of service for a considerable amount of time 
after an earthquake. An emergency radio service should be established between the districts 
· and counties, with all counties capable of contacting Bowling Green. All priority routes should 
be marked each mile with delineated posts and some a marker on the road surface showing 
the priority route, county and the milepost. All bridges on the priority routes should also be 
marked in some manner. It is probable that estimators and construction personnel may have 
to be brought into an area and might be unfamiliar with the priority routes. Each evaluation 
group should be outfitted with equipment for inspecting the routes. 
Estimators (equipment list) 
1. Helicopter 
2. FWD Vehicles 
3.ATV 
4. Radio 
5. Priority route map 
6. Instamatic Camera 
7. Portable raft 
8. Binoculars 
9. Inspection gear (ropes, harness, ladder) 
10. Rating sheet 
11. Flashlights, and emergency lighting 
12. Chain saw for clearing downed trees 
Construction Group (equipment list) 
1. Heavy equipment (Trucks, backhoes, dozers, cranes) 
2. Floating bridges 
3. Construction supplies (!-beams, stockpiles of aggregate, culvert pipes, etc.) 
4. Chain saws for clearing obstructions 
5. Emergency lighting 
It is possible that estimators and construction personnel may not be able to respond due to 
transportation problems, and/or personal problems after an earthquake. It may be possible the 
two groups will have to work together. Additional personnel and equipment should be obtained 
from the private sector. 
After establishing the post earthquake response plan, training seminars should be conducted 
two times yearly. An earthquake drill should be conducted yearly. 
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during an Earthquake. 
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Figure 14. The Twenty-six Counties in Kentucky, and the Three Counties in 
Tennessee are Included in this Study. 
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Mile point 
19.31 
19.45 
19.45 
19.70 
19.72 
19.90 
20.10 
20.63 
20.85 
20.88 
Report by County and Milepost 
for McLean County - Kentucky 
KY 136 
Feature Data 
Trees Number of Trees 200 Height 30 feet 
Diameter 18 in. Ending Milepoint 19.70 
Distance From Road 15 feet 
Road Surface Type - Flexible 
Pipeline Pipeline Type - Gas 
Road Surface Type - Flexible 
Other Gas Shutoff Valve 300 feet South of Road 
Road Surface Type - Flexible 
Other Pond: 25 feet from Road, (150 x 200) feet 
Road Surface Type - Flexible 
Fault Fault 
Fill Material Type - Soil Height 15 feet 
Side slope 2:1 Length 70 feet 
Crest 25 feet Type Fill - Other 
Road Surface Type - Flexible 
Other Caved Mine Adits 
Road Surface Type - Flexible 
Fault Fault 
Fill Material Type - Soil Height 15 feet 
Side slope 2:1 Length 200 feet 
Crest 25 feet Type Fill - Other 
Road Surface Type - Flexible 
Bridge Number of Spans 7 Over Stream Concrete T-Beam 
End 1 Fixed Pier 1 Fixed Pier 2 Fixed 
Pier 3 Fixed Pier 4 Fixed Pier 5 Fixed 
Pier 6 Fixed End 2 Fixed 
Deck Type - Concrete Length 253 feet 
Width 19 feet Pier Type - Solid 
SPC Rating - B Surface Type - Flexible 
Expansion Type - Other 
End 1 Substructure - Stub 
End 2 Substructure - Stub 
Foundation Type - Unknown 
Figure 15. Data Base from County Report. 
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Figure 17. Number of Unsafe Bridges for Each County 
in Priority Route System. 
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Figure 18. Single Span Square Structure Will Need Little if Any Retrofitting. 
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Figure 19. Skewed, Long Narrow Structure with Narrow Support Seats Are Prone to Rotate. 
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Figure 20. Transverse Shaking may Damage the Bearings, Shear Keys, or Curtain Walls 
in Skewed Bridges that Are Wide in Relation to Their Links. 
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Figure 21. Long, Continuous, Non-Skewed Bridges will Need Little if any 
Retrofitting (depends on type of bearing). 
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Figure 22. Long, Simply Supported, Non-Skewed, Multi-Span Bridges Usually 
will need to be Retrofitted. 
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Figure 24. Isolation Bearing. 
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APPENDIX B 
FLOW CHARTS FOR 
POST 'EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE 
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